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Carbon taxes represent a cost-effective way to steer the economy toward a greener
future. In the real world, their application has however been limited. In this paper,
we address one of the main obstacles to carbon taxes: public opposition. We identify drivers of and barriers to public support, and, under the form of stylized facts,
provide general lessons on the acceptability of carbon taxes. We derive our lessons
from a growing literature, as well as from a combination of policy “failures” and
“successes.” Based on our stylized facts, we formulate a set of suggestions concerning the design of carbon taxes. We consider the use of trial periods, tax escalators,
environmental earmarking, lump-sum transfers, tax rebates, and advanced communication strategies, among others. This paper contributes to the policy debate about
carbon taxes, hopefully leading to more success stories and fewer policy failures.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Putting a price on carbon is central to effective climate policy. Global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions need to step
up in all economic sectors to meet the Paris Agreement target: to keep the rise in global mean temperatures well below 2  C
above preindustrial levels. This requires a variety of policy interventions, including subsidies to support the breakthrough of
low-carbon technologies, regulatory standards to drive down the energy use of buildings, cars and appliances, and financing
schemes to overcome capital constraints (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017). However, an effective carbon price is essential to avoid
more severe interferences with the climate system (Stiglitz et al., 2018). Only if the emitters of greenhouse gases face the full
environmental costs of their actions will they manage their carbon emissions effectively. Carbon pricing alters relative prices,
leading to an automatic adjustment in behavior by firms and consumers, and creating a continuous incentive for investments in
low-carbon technological improvements. It works as a decentralized policy, in that it does not require regulators to have information on marginal abatement costs. Agents react to the carbon price based on their marginal abatement cost. By exploiting
heterogeneity in marginal abatement costs, carbon pricing allows reducing the overall abatement cost (Weitzman, 1974).
Until now, emissions trading has been the carbon pricing instrument of choice in most jurisdictions. In the European
Union, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) covers almost half of total greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon is also
traded in Canada, China, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States, although most of these schemes are limited in their
regional or sectoral scope (World Bank, 2016).
Carbon taxation, in conjunction with other regulatory measures, could be an effective way of closing policy gaps in sectors
that are not already covered by a functioning emissions trading system. In the EU, carbon taxes could play a role in reducing
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2018 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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emissions outside the EU ETS, where much of the future policy effort must lie, according to the European Environment
Agency (2016). Taxation may also play a larger role in the United Kingdom as it seeks to meet its carbon targets after Brexit.
The German Renewable Energy Federation has advocated for replacing the existing power tax with a national carbon tax for
electricity, thereby providing an alternative financing solution to expanding renewable capacity as part of Germany's lowcarbon energy transition (Wehrmann, 2017). In the United States, senior Republicans have laid out their arguments for a US
$40 carbon tax in The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends (Baker III, Feldstein, Halstead, et al., 2017).
A carbon tax is a relatively simple instrument to impose on the individual emitters, including the many smaller ones that
dominate the non-ETS sectors and are less likely than large emitting facilities or sources to engage in carbon trading. According to the expertise collected by the World Bank, cap-and-trade systems—like the EU ETS—are best suited for industrial
actors that have the capacity and skills to engage in the market actively (World Bank, 2016). With their high transaction costs,
such systems are less appealing for sectors with a large number of small emission sources, such as transportation and buildings
(Goulder & Parry, 2008). Economists advocate the use of carbon taxes because they provide the price incentive to reduce
emissions without being technologically prescriptive, are simpler to administer, and do not draw on government budgets
(Aldy & Stavins, 2012; Baranzini et al., 2017; Baumol & Oates, 1971; Goulder & Parry, 2008; Mankiw, 2009; Metcalf, 2009;
Weitzman, 2015).
Despite these advantages, carbon taxes are one of the least used climate policy instruments. In 2016, 18 countries and two
Canadian provinces have implemented a carbon tax, with Chile set to do so in 2018 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2016;
Farid et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016). In comparison, 176 countries had policy targets for renewable energy and/or energy efficiency, and 110 national and subnational jurisdictions had a feed-in tariff (REN21, 2017). Carbon tax proposals have been
undone, sometimes at an advanced political stage, for example in Australia (in 2014), France (in 2000), Switzerland (in 2000 and
2015), and most recently in the United States in Washington State (in 2016). In other contexts, policymakers may have simply
refrained from including carbon taxes in their agenda. The underutilization of carbon taxes is striking and potentially a concern.
This perspective paper explores practical ways through which carbon taxes can be made more politically attractive. It provides an extensive review of the growing empirical evidence on people's attitudes toward environmental taxes (cf. Appendix)
and, from these findings, draws lessons on publicly acceptable forms of carbon taxation. The premise is that carbon taxes can
be made more acceptable by designing them in a way that responds to voter concerns. Objections to carbon taxation are often
not about the introduction of the tax itself, but about its design (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006) and the way relevant information is shared. Sociopsychological factors—such as perceived coerciveness, equity, and justice—all affect the
extent to which voters accept different climate policy instruments (Drews & van den Bergh, 2015). Factoring them into the
design from the outset could make carbon tax legislation easier to pass.
It should be noted that popular opposition to a carbon tax is not the only reason for the limited diffusion of this instrument.
Opposition by vested interests has proved to be very effective in limiting public intervention in a wide range of environmental
issues (Oates & Portney, 2003), and their lobbying efforts can influence voters' views, preventing the passage, or even revoking the implementation of a carbon tax. In this respect, Australia is a prominent example of how regulatory capture can postpone the implementation of carbon pricing schemes, and once a scheme is eventually implemented, exert, successfully, its
power to revert to a situation of unambitious climate policy (see Crowley, 2013; Spash & Lo, 2012). Other studies, for
instance by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004), Van Asselt and Brewer (2010), Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017), and Neuhoff et al. (2015), provide insights into how vested interests and other political economy aspects have affected the design of carbon pricing in recent times.
In contrast, this paper focuses on public acceptability: addressing this lies in the hands of governments, and of public interest groups supporting effective climate policy. We present a set of stylized facts and discuss strategies that can enable a transparent and open debate on the implications of implementing a carbon tax. These strategies may contribute to addressing the
potential concerns of voters, which may be inflated by the communication strategies of energy-intensive industries. Advocacy
groups, and the scientific community, may also contribute to ensuring an informed debate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general attitudes toward carbon taxes. Section 3
focuses on the level of stringency. Section 4 focuses on the use of revenues. Section 5 provides suggestions to policymakers.
Section 6 concludes.

2 | GE NE RA L AT T I T U DE S T O W AR D C AR B O N T AX E S
The reluctance of policymakers to adopt carbon taxes, and their preference for other policy instruments, reflect at least in part
the attitudes of their country's voters (Hsu, 2011). Different quantitative and qualitative studies show people's preference for
low-carbon subsidies over taxes (Cherry, Kallbekken, & Kroll, 2012; de Groot & Schuitema's, 2012; Kallbekken & Aasen,
2010; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2006). A survey on American citizens by Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf,
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Feinberg, and Rosenthal (2013) found that while 71% of the American public support tax rebates for energy-efficient vehicles
or solar panels, only 43% would support a carbon tax, even if assumed to cost the average American household the relatively
low amount of US$180 per year. That is, voters tend to prefer subsidies and tax rebates to carbon taxes. However, the evidence is more equivocal on regulation, and the extent to which it is preferred to carbon taxes (see Cherry et al., 2012; Clinch &
Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Steg et al., 2006).
The stylized facts that we discuss in this paper, and the suggestions that we derive from them, are based on general trends
across different samples collected in various countries. There is, of course, much heterogeneity across individuals in how climate change is perceived, and in how preferences for public intervention are defined. Drews and van den Bergh (2015) provide an extensive survey of this heterogeneity, focusing principally on socioeconomic and psychological factors. A recent
paper by Cherry, Kallbekken, and Kroll (2017) suggests that deeper cultural aspects such as worldviews may also play a role
in explaining aversion to policy interventions in general, as well as to some specific instruments. For instance, their study finds
that people who are more hierarchical and/or individualistic are more averse to policy interventions than those who are more
egalitarian and/or communitarian. Instruments that are perceived as coercive are more “offensive” to individualists, while
instruments that include income redistribution are more attractive to egalitarian types.
Recognizing that there are variations in attitudes and perceptions across individuals, we identify five general reasons for
aversion to carbon taxes that have been recurrently emphasized in the literature.
Concern 1: The personal costs are perceived to be too high. There is a perception among voters that the personal costs of
a tax would be too high. A Swedish survey by Jagers and Hammar (2009) found that people associate carbon taxes with
higher personal costs, more than they do with alternative policy instruments. A discrete choice experiment by Alberini,
Scasny, and Bigano (2016) showed that Italians had a preference, among climate policy instruments, for subsidies over carbon
taxes. Participants in a lab experiment by Heres, Kallbekken, and Galarraga (2015) similarly expected higher payoffs from
subsidies than from taxes, especially when there was uncertainty on how tax revenues would be “rebated.” Ex ante, individuals tend to overestimate the cost of an environmental tax, and underestimate its benefits (Carattini et al., 2018; Odeck &
Bråthen, 2002; Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010). They are also prone to ignore the indirect costs of subsidies, which will
most likely be financed through either higher income taxes or higher electricity bills (Jagers & Hammar, 2009; Kallbekken &
Aasen, 2010). The literature in social psychology also suggests that individuals prefer subsidies because they are perceived as
less coercive than taxes. Taxes are “pushed” onto polluters, imposing a mandatory cost, while subsidies are seen as “pull”
measures, which supposedly reward climate-friendly behavior (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012; Rosentrater et al., 2012; Steg
et al., 2006).
Concern 2: Carbon taxes can be regressive. Many voters object to the regressive nature of carbon taxes. They perceive,
rightly, that without counterbalancing measures carbon taxes may have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income
households. These counterbalancing measures can, however, offset the adverse distributional effects of carbon taxes, and even
make them progressive. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that alternative climate policy instruments such as subsidies for renewable energy can also have similar regressive effects and may not generate revenues to counter them (Baranzini
et al., 2017).
Concern 3: Carbon taxes could damage the wider economy. People are concerned about the wider economic impact of a
carbon tax. This has been illustrated in Switzerland, where, in two different instances more than 10 years apart, concern about
the potential competitiveness and employment effects of energy taxes contributed to their rejection in public ballots, even in
the context of very limited unemployment (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017; Thalmann, 2004).
While these concerns are partly justified, voters may tend to overestimate competitiveness and job effects. In the specific case
of Thalmann (2004), for instance, virtually all respondents expressed concern for unemployment, despite there were no unemployed individuals in the sample and the population-wide unemployment rate was, at the time in Switzerland, below 2%.
Given that the proposals in the ballot were not especially disruptive, and given that most people in the sample were unlikely
to be seriously exposed to unemployment risks, we consider this instance as a case of overreaction. Fears of competitiveness
effects and job losses may also result from specific information campaigns led by energy-intensive companies, as in the case
of Australia (cf. Spash & Lo, 2012).
Concern 4: Carbon taxes are believed not to discourage high-carbon behavior. Individuals do not see carbon taxes as an
effective way to discourage high-carbon behavior (Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006; Steg et al., 2006). They consider
low-carbon subsidies to be a more powerful way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially if the cost of switching from
consuming high-carbon goods to low-carbon goods is considered high. Many voters believe that the price elasticity of demand
for carbon-intensive goods is close to zero. The expectation that carbon taxes do not work is one of the main reasons for their
rejection by people in surveys and real ballots (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Carattini et al., 2017; Hsu, Walters, & Purgas,
2008; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011).
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Concern 5: Governments may want to tax carbon to increase their revenues. The final reason for opposition is that individuals are often suspicious of government motives. They assume—as a direct consequence of concern 4 above—that the purpose of introducing a carbon tax is not to reduce greenhouse gases but to increase government revenues (Klok et al., 2006). At
its core, this is an issue of trust. Trust issues sometimes concern the specific environmental tax proposal under consideration,
but they may also be broader, related to people's general view of tax policy or even to trust in the government itself
(Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; Hammar & Jagers, 2006).
Some of these perceptions are incorrect. There is evidence that carbon pricing does in fact reduce emissions (J. Andersson,
2015; Baranzini & Carattini, 2014; Martin, de Preux, & Wagner, 2014) and has so far had a minimal impact on the wider
economy, in terms of adversely affecting the competitiveness of domestic industry, at least in the presence of adjustments and
specific measures tailored to support the most exposed firms (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017). On the other hand, voters are
right to suspect that governments would probably welcome the extra revenues. Indeed, its benign fiscal implications are often
highlighted as one of the merits of a carbon tax (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017). It is also the case that carbon taxes are often
regressive; without counter measures they may affect poor households disproportionately (Gough, Abdallah, Johnson, Ryan
Collins, & Smith, 2012; Metcalf, 2009; Speck, 1999; Sterner, 2011). From a public acceptability perspective, the accuracy of
public perceptions is less important than the fact that they are widely held and can hinder the adoption of otherwise desirable
policies. Policymakers, however, are encouraged to strive for the design that minimizes the cost for society, while ensuring it
receives sufficient public support. Understanding public perceptions is a first step in this direction.

3 | AT T I T UD E S T OW AR D TA X R AT E S
When designing a carbon tax, a key decision is the level at which the tax should be set and how it may evolve over time. Is it
better to start with a high tax rate that remains fairly constant over time, or to increase tax levels gradually? Climate change
economists usually recommend a carbon tax that increases over time, since this aligns with the prospect of an increasingly
tighter carbon constraint. The required tax level is determined by the environmental objective and more specifically by the
marginal costs of meeting a given emissions target (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017). A rising schedule may raise concerns about
a possible response from fossil fuel producers, who could accelerate fossil fuel extraction in anticipation of higher taxes (the
so-called Green Paradox). However, following Hotelling's rule, a Green Paradox would only occur if the tax rate was to rise
too fast, and in particular if its growth rate was constantly above the interest rate (van der Ploeg & Withagen, 2015).
3.1 | The impact of tax level on attitudes
It is a standard tenet of public choice theory that people do not like high taxes. It is not immediately obvious, however, that
the same sentiment should extend to environmental taxes such as those on carbon. Environmental taxes are Pigovian taxes
(after Pigou, 1920), put in place to correct a market failure. Voters may accept them on the grounds that they address a problem people care about. Yet empirical studies consistently find that the standard objection to high taxes also holds for carbon
taxes (Brännlund & Persson, 2012; Carattini et al., 2017; Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015; Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011;
Thalmann, 2004). People's attitudes to carbon taxes appear to be influenced more by the direct personal cost of the measure
than by an appreciation of the environmental objective (Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011).
Consequently, the public acceptability of an environmental tax depends heavily on its policy stringency, since the proposed tax rate determines the direct costs to consumers. Aversion to higher tax rates is even found when revenues are redistributed to the population. That is, voters tend to dislike sudden changes to taxation even if, on paper, these may not make them
worse off.
The effect of tax levels on acceptability can be measured relatively precisely with choice experiments. For instance, Sælen
and Kallbekken (2011) assessed the acceptability of fuel taxes in Norway, analyzing the responses of 1,147 survey participants. Brännlund and Persson (2012) studied the acceptability of carbon taxes with a survey of 2,400 Swedish citizens. Gevrek
and Uyduranoglu (2015) surveyed 1,252 individuals from 16 Turkish cities about their attitude to a carbon tax. All three studies found that the acceptability of a tax proposal decreases with the personal cost it would impose on survey respondents.
Two Swiss studies have used voter surveys to analyze the drivers of public opposition in public ballots. Thalmann (2004)
analyzed the responses of a representative sampling of 990 Swiss residents after a referendum in the year 2000 on three different energy tax proposals, all of which were rejected. While the magnitude of the tax rate was not a decisive factor for most
voters, Thalmann showed that it was important to a fraction of voters with a particular concern about the cost of the tax. Carattini et al. (2017) analyze another tax proposal, put forward in 2015, which was rejected by 92% of voters. The proposal
entailed a tax swap in which a new energy tax on nonrenewable energy would have generated the same revenues as valueadded tax, which would have disappeared completely. The complete replacement of the value-added tax, and the constraint to

CARATTINI ET AL.

5 of 26

160

Predicted percentage of votes in favor of a carbon tax, by
carbon tax rates. Note. Filled circles indicate observation in the
sample; empty circles indicate observations obtained through
extrapolation. In this scenario, the choice experiment assumed that
revenues would be used to reduce the value-added tax, as in the
referendum case. (Reprinted with permission from Carattini
et al. (2017). © The Author(s) 2017 Open Access. This article is
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/))
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keep revenues constant over time, would have implied a high, and growing, tax rate. This concern, and its implications for distributional and competitiveness effects, led, among other factors examined in the paper, to the massive rejection in the ballot.
To analyze how alternative tax designs could have performed in a ballot, Carattini et al. (2017) administered a second survey,
a choice experiment with a representative sample of 1,200 Swiss voters. The researchers found that the acceptability of the tax
almost linearly decreased as the tax rates increased (see Figure 1). They also found that people with low levels of climate
change concern showed a higher sensitivity to tax rates, while people with stronger climate change concern paid less attention
to price levels.
3.2 | The impact of time and experience on attitudes
There is evidence that public opposition to high Pigovian tax rates may not be persistent. Instead, voter aversion may abate
once a policy is implemented, as people become more familiar with the measure and are better able to gauge its costs and
benefits. This is important as it suggests that, under favorable circumstances, Pigovian tax rates can ultimately be raised to the
environmentally appropriate level.
The best evidence on the ability of voters to update their beliefs comes from studies of congestion charges and taxes on
waste. Hensher and Li (2013) reviewed the difference in the ex ante and ex post acceptability of congestion charges in
London, several cities in Norway, and Stockholm. In Stockholm, people voted in a referendum after trialing a congestion
charge. The review suggests that a large proportion of survey participants in these cities would have rejected the congestion
charge prior to its introduction. However, many of them changed their mind once they saw the effectiveness of the tax in
reducing road usage and felt the benefit of reduced congestion (see also Börjesson, Eliasson, Hugosson, & Brundell-Freij,
2012; Eliasson & Jonsson, 2011; Odeck & Bråthen, 2002; Schuitema et al., 2010; Winslott-Hiselius, Brundell-Freij,
Vagland, & Byström, 2009). People also learned that the perceived costs of the charge were smaller than expected, and not
greater than the personal and social benefits (Schuitema et al., 2010). There is also evidence from the Swedish city of Gothenburg, which also organized a trial for its congestion charge, to suggest that acceptability increased with experience. The policy
was still rejected in the subsequent nonbinding referendum, but survey data showed that acceptability would have been 5%
lower if voters had expressed their opinion before the trial (Hansla, Hysing, Nilsson, & Martinsson, 2017). Another survey
shows that, once the policy was in place, both commuters and noncommuters were less skeptical about it (D. Andersson &
Nässén, 2016).
Carattini et al. (2018) exploited a regulatory change in a region of Switzerland, which enabled them to analyze people's
perceptions and acceptance of pricing domestic refuse by the bag before and after the scheme's implementation, and to compare them with a control group composed of people living in municipalities that had already implemented the tax. Their study
suggests that residents were willing to pay 70% more for the price of a refuse bag once the policy was implemented than they
had been before. They perceived the tax to be much more effective and fair once it had been applied.
In a more generic study, Cherry, Kallbekken, and Kroll (2014) designed a lab experiment in which participants in some
treatments were given the chance to experience a Pigovian tax during a trial period, before voting on how to address the negative impacts of their own action on others. Trial runs were shown to help participants overcome, at least in part, their aversion
to Pigovian taxes.
An important caveat needs to be introduced at this stage. It is difficult to extrapolate the findings from one policy area
(transport, waste) and apply them to another (carbon taxation). The issues differ markedly in the ease with which benefits can
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be made visible to voters and in the salience of policy effects on behavior, with the positive impacts of a congestion or waste
charge being much more immediately obvious than those resulting from a carbon tax. That said, there is some encouraging
evidence on carbon taxation from the Canadian province of British Columbia. British Columbia's carbon tax was set at a tax
rate of C$10 per ton of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) when implemented in 2008, and then increased by C$5 per tCO2e each year
up to C$30 per tCO2e in 2012. Murray and Rivers (2015) show with poll data that despite this threefold increase in the tax rate
in just 7 years, public support for the tax grew from relatively low support to moderate support, and surpassed 50% in 2011,
3 years after the tax was implemented.

4 | AT T I T UD E S T OW AR D TH E U S E O F TA X R E V E N UE S
Another defining feature of a carbon tax is how its revenues are proposed to be spent. Fiscal experts would recommend that
tax proceeds should be treated as general government revenue. This method enables governments to optimize the tax system
as a whole and incorporate climate change into overall tax and spending decisions, alongside other public policy concerns
(Bowen, 2015).
However, empirical studies show that, against the wishes of experts, public acceptance for a carbon tax is higher if the use
of proceeds is clearly specified. The literature has explored three revenue recycling strategies in particular: the earmarking of
revenues to support emission reduction projects, the redistribution of revenues to achieve a fairer (less fiscally regressive) outcome, and the reduction of other taxes to achieve a revenue-neutral outcome.
In investigating which strategies are most popular, an early set of studies used focus groups to gather people's opinion.
These focus group studies, which were conducted in Denmark (Klok et al., 2006), France (Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006),
Germany (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006), Ireland (Clinch & Dunne, 2006), and the United Kingdom (Dresner, Jackson, &
Gilbert, 2006), all showed that earmarking energy tax revenue to support further emissions reductions was the most preferred
option for their participants, followed by social cushioning measures to help vulnerable groups, such as low-income households and those living in remote areas. Revenue-neutral forms of redistribution implying a reduction in existing taxes were the
least preferred option for recycling tax revenues.
Three key options for revenue recycling, and the reasons for their popularity, are explored in what follows. While considering these options, policymakers are encouraged to also evaluate their cost, as all of them diverge from the “first-best” tax
designs advocated by economists.
4.1 | Earmarking proceeds
The attractiveness of earmarking carbon tax revenues has been established in a range of contexts (cf. Baranzini & Carattini,
2017; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Bristow, Wardman, Zannia, & Chintakayalab, 2010; Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch &
Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006; Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015; Kallbekken &
Aasen, 2010; Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011; Klok et al., 2006; Thalmann, 2004). The same preference also holds in other areas
of environmental policy. For example, Beuermann and Santarius (2006), Garling and Schuitema (2007), and Odeck and
Bråthen (2002), find that the acceptability of congestion charges and fuel taxes increases if revenues are used to improve public transport.
The interest in earmarking reflects two voter concerns. The first is a lack of trust in government: voters do not trust politicians to make good use of revenues, if not specifically earmarked or redistributed back to the population (Beuermann &
Santarius, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Hammar & Jagers, 2006). The second concern is doubt about the effectiveness
of carbon taxes (as explained in Section 2 above). Using tax revenues for additional emissions reduction reassures voters that
the tax will be effective and the environmental objective will be met (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Kallbekken et al., 2011;
Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011).
Earmarking signals to the public that efforts are being made to make low-carbon options both technologically and commercially more viable and so will reduce the personal cost of changing behavior (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010). Earmarking is
also seen as a potential solution to a perceived underinvestment in low-carbon research and development. For example in a
study for Vancouver, Hsu et al. (2008) found that individuals were willing to increase fuel tax rates if the revenue was earmarked for environmental technologies. Similarly, Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) found in a Norwegian study that earmarking
tax revenues for environmental purposes (such as supporting public transport, construction of bicycle and footpaths, noise
screening, or development of clean technologies) garnered majority support to increase fuel taxes by up to 15%.
It should, however, be noted that earmarking revenues for environmental purposes may not be a universal solution. A
Swedish survey conducted by Jagers and Hammar (2009) showed that respondents were unwilling to increase carbon tax rates,
as they felt the carbon taxes they paid on transport fuels were high enough already. Respondents preferred alternative policies
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such as decreasing taxes on clean energy sources, expanding public transport, and increasing information campaigns about
vehicles' contribution to climate change. In the same vein, residents in Edinburgh considered that the public transport system
was already well funded and functioning when a congestion charge with revenues to be earmarked for public transport was
proposed to them (Gaunt, Rye, & Allen, 2007).
Additional evidence suggests that preferences for revenue recycling may be context dependent. In their discrete choice
experiment on Swiss energy taxes, Carattini et al. (2017) found that providing information about the environmental effectiveness of different carbon tax designs reduces the preference for environmental earmarking. The authors used modeled results of
the impacts on the wider Swiss economy of different carbon tax designs to inform respondents about the greenhouse gas
abatement achieved under different combinations of tax rates and revenue recycling rules. Under all scenarios, a carbon tax
produced a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Providing this information reduced voters' doubt about the effectiveness of
carbon taxes, and in turn reduced the demand for environmental earmarking.

4.2 | Compensating low-income households
A second important approach to revenue recycling is the use of tax proceeds to compensate potential losers. Several strategies
have been put forward in the literature to address potential adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax, including in the influential perspectives of Speck (1999), Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000), and Metcalf (2009). In what follows, we cover
what we consider the main options, based on the literature and on actual policymaking.
We begin with lump-sum transfers. Compensation via lump-sum transfers is progressive because fixed amounts of compensation account for a greater proportion of income in low-income households. Since low-income households tend to spend
less, in absolute terms, on energy consumption than their high-income counterparts, carbon taxes with lump-sum transfers tend
overall to be progressive: that is, low-income households are likely to receive compensation from the government amounting
to more than the cost increase that they suffer. If all tax revenues are redistributed back to the population, a carbon tax with
lump-sum transfers represents a revenue-neutral reform.
Another option is social cushioning. Social cushioning is purposely designed to be progressive by providing lower-income
households with a higher amount of the tax revenue, for instance through an especially generous income tax rebate or through
targeted lump sum transfers. Social cushioning measures have been used for instance in Alberta and British Columbia,
Canada, (Carl & Fedor, 2016). Further ways to design carbon taxes to make the outcomes progressive, and hence more
socially acceptable, are shown in Table 1.
Everything else equal, the literature finds a positive relationship between progressivity and acceptability. People seem to
value tax schemes that are perceived to be fair and that create a lighter burden for low-income households. Distributional
issues are a constant feature of qualitative studies, as they are virtually always brought up by interviewees (e.g., Beuermann &
Santarius, 2006; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006; Kallbekken &
Aasen, 2010). The importance of distributional effects is also confirmed in quantitative surveys (e.g., Baranzini & Carattini,
2017; Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011). Choice experiments are especially well designed to test the acceptability of different features of a carbon tax, including their effect on low-income households. Bristow et al. (2010) started to analyze people's preferences for progressive cost distributions by testing the acceptability of a tax threshold (cf. Table 1), which received relatively
strong support from survey respondents. Designs that are explicitly presented to the respondent as progressive, as in
Brännlund and Persson (2012) and Gevrek and Uyduranoglu (2015), also perform better than neutral or regressive designs,
everything else being equal.
TABLE 1

Ways a carbon tax can be designed to be progressive

Design option

Mechanisms

Differentiated
tax rates

• Threshold taxes: Consumption of carbon below a certain level is exempt from a carbon tax, which, in practice, is equivalent to redistributing
part of the revenues through lump-sum transfers (e.g., if the threshold is 4 tons of CO2 and the price is $40/tCO2, $160 would be redistributed
to make the first 4 tons “free”)

Revenue
recycling

• Lump-sum transfers, distributed across households in equal shares (per capita)
• Lump-sum transfers, distributed across eligible households, with eligibility depending on, for example, household income (e.g., Alberta,
Canada, provides lump-sum transfers only to households below a given income threshold)
• Lump-sum transfers whose amount is defined based on equivalence scales (e.g., Alberta gives less weight to children or the second adult when
redistributing revenues across eligible households)
• Subsidies/grants for low-carbon technologies, with eligibility restricted to low-income households
• Subsidies for low-carbon options that low-income households are more likely to use (e.g., public transport)

Other social
cushioning
measures

• Subsidies to compensate low-income households (paid through general budget), not necessarily tied to low-carbon consumption (e.g., food
stamps)
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However, the literature suggests that when there is a clear trade-off in the use of revenues between environmental earmarking
and socially progressive redistribution forms, people tend to prefer to use revenues for environmental earmarking (Baranzini &
Carattini, 2017; Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011). The misperception that a carbon tax by itself will not lead to a reduction in emissions seems to be the dominant concern; before giving their support, people want to be sure that the carbon tax leads to lower
emissions. Nevertheless, concerns over the distribution of impacts are likely to persist, and at the margin may make the difference
between a successful policy and one that is rejected. However, policymakers can reduce the demand for environmental earmarking by providing information on the effectiveness of the planned carbon tax. In the study by Carattini et al. (2017), the most
favored options for using revenue were redistribution through lump-sum transfers, and social cushioning. In the setting of this
study, information was provided to respondents also on the distributional effects of each design. Social cushioning represented,
by design, the most progressive redistribution form. Thanks to the information that they received, people also realized the favorable distributional properties of lump-sum transfers, which may not otherwise be evident to the general public.

4.3 | Cutting other taxes
The third main strategy for the use of tax proceeds is to cut other taxes and secure in this way full or partial revenue neutrality.
Empirical studies show that cutting other taxes is the least popular redistribution strategy among the public (Beuermann &
Santarius, 2006; Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006; Klok et al., 2006; Thalmann, 2004). This is in contrast to many economists, for whom using tax revenues to reduce distortionary taxes is the ideal solution. By using carbon tax revenues levied on
“bads,” such as greenhouse gas emissions, to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, profits, or consumption, which discourage
desirable activities, one can hope to achieve higher economic output on top of emissions abatement, and so obtain a “double
dividend” (cf. Goulder, 1995).
Qualitative studies offer possible explanations for people's resistance to this third strategy. One reason for public opposition is that voters do not necessarily buy into the logic behind the double dividend. Focus groups with voters in Denmark
(Klok et al., 2006), Germany (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006), Norway (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010), and the United Kingdom
(Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006) show that people do not make the link between a policy that is aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the desire to reduce taxes in a different area. They perceive these to be separate problems requiring
separate solutions. Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) describe this cognitive dissonance as an “issue-linkage” problem.
Another reason for public opposition is a lack of trust in politicians and fiscal authorities (Hammar & Jagers, 2006). Even
if people understand how a revenue-neutral carbon tax would work, they may not believe that the government will actually
implement these tax shifts (Klok et al., 2006). This puts the onus on the tax authorities to introduce commitment devices that
reassure the public that the promised use of revenues would be maintained. Once the policy is implemented, governments
could use information devices to increase the visibility of the tax shift. Compensation can be made visible by displaying the
amount of income that is rebated on payslips, tax slips, or in contributions to social insurance (Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner,
2006; Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2008).

5 | POLICY IM PLICA TIONS A ND S UGGEST IONS
The growing empirical understanding of public attitudes toward environmental taxation can enable policymakers to design
carbon taxes in a way that is more acceptable to voters. Below we offer some concrete design options that appear particularly
promising to increase public support. While fairly prescriptive, these are high-level suggestions that policymakers will have to
adjust to their own political economy context. The options all diverge from the “first-best” tax designs advocated by economists and therefore require a trade-off between the theoretically desirable and the practically feasible. That is, while these suggestions may make implementing a carbon tax easier, they all come with an efficiency cost. Our objective is not to distract
policymakers from their pursuit of cost-effectiveness. Our purpose is to increase the probability that a carbon tax is passed into
legislation, in a world in which still too often carbon taxes are rejected, or do not emerge, because of lacking public support.
Hence, in our perspective, an imperfect carbon tax may still be better than no carbon tax at all. That said, we encourage policymakers to strive, everything else equal, for the design that minimizes the cost for society. Policymakers should not accept, passively, the existence of information asymmetries and biased perceptions. Policymakers should take a proactive stance and
address these asymmetries. We provide specific suggestions in this respect.
Some of the options that we consider in the following sections may be implemented in conjunction; others are mutually
exclusive. Regardless of which are used, the proposed carbon tax will require extensive information sharing and careful communication, both before and after implementation, to build continued trust and credibility. We review the suggestions in turn.
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5.1 | Phasing in carbon taxes over time
By phasing in carbon taxes gradually, policymakers can take advantage of the fact that aversion tends to abate once people
have experienced a policy. A slow ramp-up, or even a trial period, provides individuals with the opportunity to gauge the costs
and benefits of the tax. Taxes can then be raised progressively until they reach the level required to meet the environmental
objective. Note that this may imply renouncing to allowing the carbon tax rate to fluctuate depending on the business cycle,
although this type of flexibility might be welfare improving (cf. Doda, 2016).
The risk with this strategy is that carbon taxes may be frozen at a level that is not sufficient to achieve their intended objectives. For example, the United Kingdom carbon price support, a tax on carbon emissions to ensure a minimum carbon price
for UK facilities participating in the EU emissions trading system, was introduced in 2013 at £16 per ton of CO2 and was
expected to steadily increase over time, up to £30 by 2020. Since 2015, the tax has, however, remained constant at £18.08,
despite the original commitment to increase it further (Ares & Delebarre, 2016).
There are two potential, and complementary, solutions to overcome this risk. The first solution relies on societal learning.
The second solution uses commitment devices.
Societal learning about the exact costs and benefits of the tax can overcome potential resistance since public acceptability
tends to increase the more experience people have with carbon taxes. It is important that governments provide detailed information on the achieved reductions in greenhouse gases, but also that they highlight local cobenefits such as reduced congestion and improved air quality.
Commitment devices can ensure that initially low-carbon tax rates will escalate toward the rate required to meet greenhouse gas reduction objectives. Commitment devices can provide clarity about the long-term direction of travel, and reducing
the risk that tax rates become subject to political cycles. The most common device is declaring explicit tax schedules to raise
carbon tax rates. In Canada, the province of British Columbia introduced its carbon tax rate at C$10/ton CO2 in 2008, and successfully increased it by C$5/ton CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) each year to eventually reach C$30/ tCO2e in 2012 (Murray & Rivers, 2015). France has a more ambitious long-term program: it introduced the carbon tax rate in 2014 at €7/tCO2e, committing
to increase the rate by €8.50/tCO2 per year to reach €56/tCO2 in 2020, with further plans to increase it to €100/tCO2 in 2030
(World Bank, 2016). Switzerland sets emissions objectives in its CO2 Act (Nachmany et al., 2015). If predefined intermediate
objectives for the emission reduction pathway are not met, the Swiss carbon tax rate, which covers only thermal fuels, can be
increased by the government without consulting the legislator (Baranzini et al., 2017). For instance, the Swiss government
was legally entitled to increase the tax rate from CHF60 to CHF84/tCO2e in 2016, as Switzerland underperformed on its
emission reductions (1 Swiss Franc/CHF is approximately equal to 1 US dollar.)
5.2 | Earmarking tax revenues for additional climate change mitigation
Voters have a preference for earmarking tax revenues and using the proceeds for additional greenhouse gas emissions reductions. They are particularly keen on support for low-carbon research and development, along with subsidies to promote
deployment.
Earmarking—or, in fiscal jargon, hypothecation—also responds to the widely-held perception that on their own, carbon
taxes are not effective. People tend to overestimate the costs of switching from high-carbon to low-carbon options. They
believe additional government support to help them reduce emissions is necessary.
The demand for environmental earmarking may decrease over time as people observe the impact of the tax and update
their beliefs. Governments can again support this process by providing effective information about emissions trends, the distributional effects of the tax, and any ancillary benefits. Revenues may then be freed up gradually to address other sources of
voter aversion, or to obtain economic gains.
Tapering the degree of earmarking can also allay a government's concerns about fiscal management. A telling example is
the French carbon tax, which was introduced in 2014: in the first year, 100% of revenues were dedicated to green transition
plans, but this level of earmarking declined over time, to 44% in 2015 and 38% in 2016, with the remaining proportion of tax
revenue going to general funds (Carl & Fedor, 2016; World Bank, 2016). The earmarking of tax revenues is controversial
among fiscal experts because it complicates fiscal management. Earmarking commits the government to spending specific
amounts of money on reducing emissions, even if there may be a poor match between actual spending needs and the revenues
raised (Goulder & Parry, 2008).
5.3 | Redistributing taxes to improve fairness
Carbon taxes can be made more acceptable if tax revenues are used to address important societal concerns. In surveys, individuals generally prefer to use revenues for environmental purposes, but do not dislike using them to ease the impact on lowincome households, which is a source of concern for most of them. The scope for redistributing tax revenues could increase
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over time, as higher tax rates are phased in (per option 1) and as the demand for earmarking decreases (per option 2). While
the objective of a carbon tax is to address the climate externality, and not to address the issue of raising inequalities, there may
still be the expectation that carbon taxes are designed in a way that at least does not lead to a more unequal distribution.
Carbon taxes can be designed to be both revenue neutral and progressive through lump-sum transfers and social cushioning measures to reduce costs for low-income households. Some voters may, however, be suspicious about a government's
long-term commitment to redistribution. To allay those fears, governments can use commitment devices, such as explicit plans
on how revenues are to be redistributed. For instance, the Ministry of Finance in British Columbia is required by law to make
explicit its plans every year, which are then approved by the Legislative Assembly. Annual reports can make redistribution
transparent by providing regular updates on how revenues are used. Redistribution can also be made directly visible to the
general public, for instance, by issuing explicit rebate cheques to households and firms. In all cases, governments would maintain the option to lower other social security measures as a result of the implementation of a carbon tax. This option suggests
that there is no perfect way to allay people's concerns. At the same time, we note that by lowering other social security
measures, governments would likely need the support of the legislative bodies, which can be assumed, in the general case, to
be attentive to the concerns of their constituencies.
5.4 | Information sharing and communication
A final suggestion applies to all efforts to implement a carbon tax, regardless of the use of revenues, or level of stringency.
It concerns information sharing. As soon as policymakers start considering the design of a carbon tax, they should provide
detailed information (obtained through analysis and perhaps model simulations) to navigate the process of public consultations
and to pre-emptively address voter concerns. This disclosure would ideally occur before voters are called to a ballot, or before
lawmakers consider a carbon tax bill in the parliament. Providing rigorous analytical information through different, trusted
channels and devices may ensure that the public debate about the effects of a carbon tax is based on the best available
evidence. Important analytical results governments (or a trusted and independent institution) may wish to share include:
• The greenhouse gas reductions likely to be achieved at the chosen rate, and those achieved if tax rates are increased
over time.
• Any local cobenefits, such as reduced congestion, air pollution, and health costs, improved atmospheric visibility and
quality of life.
• Expected variation in cost for the goods most likely to be affected by the tax.
• Expected impact on the income of the average household as well as of low-income households.
• Expected impact on the economy, including potential job losses or gains, along with simple explanations on the dynamics
leading to the emergence of a double dividend, if any.
This information would account for any measures undertaken to minimize negative impacts, including tax rebates, lumpsum transfers, or other social cushioning measures. Both Carattini et al. (2017) and Klenert et al. (2017) argue that a good
communication strategy that increases the visibility of the progressiveness of lump-sum transfers can convince voters that
these “dividends” can overcome fundamental issues of distributional fairness, political trust, and policy stability.
An interesting example of a communication strategy is offered by the Citizens' Climate Lobby (CCL), an interest group
active in promoting the implementation of a carbon tax with lump-sum redistribution of revenues in the United States as well
as in other countries. One of the CCL's main activities is communicating the functioning of the carbon tax to the general
public. Their strategy starts with the name that they give to their carbon tax proposal: “carbon fee and dividend.” Thanks to
external studies, the CCL is able to communicate some general approximations of the effects of its proposal on a relatively
large set of outcomes, including the amount of the “dividend” that households would receive thanks to the carbon tax. General
equilibrium effects on jobs, and economic output, are also provided, with variation at the regional level. These findings come
from two preliminary consulting studies. Nystrom and Luckow (2014) evaluate the effect of a carbon fee and dividend on different sectors and regions in the United States. Unmel (2016) examines household consumption expenditures along different
dimensions (including income, race and location) and measures the potential effect of the carbon fee and dividend in a static
environment.
Clear communication strategies can also help to counter some of the claims that opponents of the tax may put forward.
The “industrial flight” argument, that is, that businesses could relocate if climate policy is too stringent, may resonate particularly strongly with the general public (Spash & Lo, 2012). If voters are able to correctly evaluate the competitiveness risks to
which firms are exposed, they are more likely to support reasonable carbon tax rates and vote against unjustified exemptions.
Deroubaix and Lévèque (2006) show, for instance, that focus groups in France thought it was unfair for industries to be
exempted from the energy tax reform (ETR) in 2000, arguing that all polluters needed to pay for the tax. Participants in a
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similar focus group organized in Denmark argued for a system rewarding polluters based on their efforts to become greener
(Klok et al., 2006), rather than on their exposure to foreign competition, which is the criterion that economists would use to
define “optimal” exemptions (Martin et al., 2014).
Communication efforts need to continue once the policy is implemented. Perceptions of a carbon tax may improve over
time. The evidence that we mentioned above comes, however, from British Columbia, where the local government is committed to providing regular information on the tax to the population. Without this type of device, perceptions—and awareness—
of carbon taxes may remain unchanged. For example, a survey by Baranzini and Carattini (2017), administered in 2012, suggests that a surprisingly large proportion of the population may not be aware of the carbon tax on heating fuels that the Swiss
government introduced in 2008. Even fewer people seem to be aware that the revenues from this tax are redistributed lump
sum to households, through automatic reduction in mandatory health care bills, in which this information is reported in fine
print. According to a survey by INFRAS (2015), only a quarter of the 1,012 respondents interviewed were aware of the mode
of redistribution.
Because the effects of carbon taxes are often not visible, governments are encouraged to measure their effects regularly
and inform their citizens about them transparently. The provision of annual reports that include plans on how revenues have
been redistributed in the past and how they will be distributed in the future provides evidence of transparency, credibility, and
commitment of a government to execute a carbon tax as originally intended. A world without carbon tax is by definition not
observable, once the carbon tax is implemented. Communicating the effect of a carbon tax may therefore be difficult when
greenhouse gas emissions increase from year to year, but would have increased even more without the tax. Communication
strategies need to be adapted to the fact that the general public may have little familiarity with the empirical toolkit of policy
evaluation. Similar adjustments may need to be undertaken also ex ante, if greenhouse gases are expected to increase. Communication strategies also need to be tailored to the context in which they are used. Who provides this information, and how it
is framed, may matter for acceptability. Communication strategies may need to be adapted to the beliefs and worldviews of
the targeted population (Cherry et al., 2017), and also take into account the potential implications of political polarization and
bipartisan divides (Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Kahan et al., 2011).

6 | CON CLU SION S
Making carbon taxation more acceptable to the public is important because it is an effective way of incentivizing the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions. By putting a price on carbon, emitters are confronted with the environmental cost of their
actions, and incentivized to manage their carbon output.
Economists prefer carbon pricing over subsidies because it is less prescriptive technologically, simpler to administer and
does not draw on government budgets. They prefer carbon pricing over carbon regulation because it affords emitters the flexibility to find their own way of reducing emissions. There is an important place for both subsidies and regulation in climate
change policy, and most countries rightly use a mix of instruments. Nevertheless, putting a price on carbon is an essential
aspect of cost-effective emissions reduction. Carbon taxes have a role to play even in jurisdictions that already have an emissions trading system, such as the European Union. They offer an effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions outside
the trading scheme.
Voters are instinctively against new taxes, even if they are explicitly aimed at preventing environmental harm. They are
doubtful about the effectiveness of a carbon tax, dislike its coercive nature, and are concerned about its impact on low-income
households. These perceptions are not necessarily all correct, but they matter, and they have made it difficult to pass carbon
tax proposals in the past. However, there are practical options to overcome these constraints. If policies are well designed, they
will be more acceptable to, and accepted by the public. There are also practical options to try to correct misperceptions, for
instance on short-term versus long-term elasticities. If policies are well communicated, the necessary gap between what is optimal and what is politically feasible may close over time.
The suggestions in this paper are based on the current state of the literature. While drawing our suggestions, we hit in a
few instances what we think is the frontier in this literature. The role of communication strategies seem, in particular, to have
been largely neglected. Understanding under which conditions information asymmetries can be addressed is a crucial step to
guide policymakers, and the general public, toward policies that are both acceptable and cost-effective. Providing information
in a randomized fashion, in different forms and from different sources, may represent a promising avenue for future research.
A first step in this direction has been taken, for instance, by an emerging experimental literature on public support for domestic versus international greenhouse gas emissions abatements (Baranzini, Borzykowski, & Carattini, 2018; Buntaine & Prather,
2018; Diederich & Goeschl, 2018). Furthermore, the effect of information provision may vary depending on the method used.
A better understanding of the relationship between the methodology used and the findings it produces, for instance based on a
meta-analytical approach, may inform the literature on the opportunities and limits of each methodological option. In this

CARATTINI ET AL.

12 of 26

respect, we invite authors to disclose more fully their research design and the information that was provided to respondents,
participants, or voters.
Our paper does not include specific sections on hybrid strategies mixing different revenue recycling options. While these
are relevant in our context, they have been underexplored in the literature, plausibly to limit the cognitive load in surveys and
experiments. While it is reasonable that scholars look for low-hanging fruits first, the literature is now sufficiently mature to
expect future papers to also tackle more complex policy designs and realistic situations.
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A PPEN D IX A: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS TESTING FACTORS AFFECTING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF
CARBON TAXES

Study
(listed in order of
publication year)
Thalmann (2004)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested
Where and when:
Switzerland, 2000.
Type of policy intervention:
Three ballot proposals for
ETR that include green tax
(with revenue recycling),
energy conservation tax
(revenue used to promote
energy conservation and
renewables), and solar
initiative (tax revenue used
for solar and energy
efficiency use).

Methodological details

Empirical findings

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of possible
combinations of votes (yes, no,
and abstention) for three
proposals, and of turnout in the
ballot.

Explanations of acceptance of energy taxes: Respondents were
more accepting of energy taxes if they had leftist or green
affinities, higher education levels, lived in cities, did not own
cars, and were younger than 60 years old. This study
demonstrates that the actual referendum had more “yes” votes
because more educated people (who also were in favor of ETRs)
participated in the vote, in comparison with the number of yes
votes that were modeled based on answers of survey respondents.
As the study included citizens who did not participate in the
actual referendum, the study finds that “yes” votes would be
fewer if the entire voting population participated in the
referendum. The study also found subjective characteristics of
political preferences and attitudes toward environmental
protection were correlated. Those who valued environmental
protection were more willing to accept government intervention,
while those who valued wealth preferred markets to be selfregulated. Concern for income inequality and unemployment did
lower acceptance for ETRs. Only half the respondents were
concerned about the former issue while almost all expressed
concern for the latter, despite the very low unemployment rate at
the time of the ballot. For most respondents, the tax rate was not a
decisive factor in explaining rejection of energy taxes. However,
the magnitude of the tax rate led to increased rejection in groups
particularly concerned about the costs of energy taxes (e.g.,
multiple car owners). Although concern about income inequality
did lower the acceptance rate of energy tax, it was not an
important issue for the majority of respondents.

Data collection: “VOX” opinion
surveys of 990 Swiss citizens.

Use of carbon tax revenues: Broad revenue recycling, including
lowering labor taxes (in the case of this study, by reducing
contributions to social security) did not make ETR more
acceptable than earmarking tax revenues to support
environmental efforts, with the former proposal obtaining 44.6%
“yes” votes, and the latter 46.6%. Note, however, that a third
proposal received much less support (31.9% of “yes” votes). This
proposal was designed to earmark revenues for a narrow set of
low-carbon energy initiatives.
Beuermann and
Santarius (2006)

Clinch and Dunne
(2006)

Where and when: Germany,
2000–2001.

Methodology: Qualitative analysis
of interviews and focus groups.

Type of policy intervention:
ETR introduced in 1999,
which involved increasing
fuel taxes and using fuel tax
revenue to reduce pension
contributions.

Data collection: Interviews with
policymakers and firms from
five key industries, and five
focus groups representing the
general public.

Where and when: Ireland,
before 2006.

Methodology: Qualitative analysis
of interviews and focus groups.

Policy intervention:
Hypothetical fuel tax reform
(keeping tax revenue
neutral).

Data collection: Interviews with
businesses and policymakers,
and eight focus groups (with
eight members in each group
split evenly between males and
females) to represent the Irish
public.

Use of energy tax revenues: Trust in government played an
important role in finding acceptable revenue-neutral fuel taxes
through the ETR, especially with regard to believing that
governments would actually redistribute fuel tax revenue to lower
pension contributions (instead of using tax revenue to increase the
general budget), and believing government's results showing that
revenue-neutral fuel taxes had been effective in improving
environmental and employment outcomes. People could see the
increase in fuel costs but not the corresponding decrease in
pension contributions in their pay or tax slips, creating a saliencerelated problem. Even if people understood that the revenueneutral tax was meant to achieve the “double dividend” of
decreasing emissions while increasing employment, they believed
the effect was not real or that it was negligible. Respondents were
more supportive of earmarking fuel tax revenues for making lowcarbon alternatives more affordable (e.g., public transport) as a
more acceptable form of revenue recycling than keeping fuel
taxes revenue neutral, as it reduces the perceived personal costs of
the fuel tax.
Explanations of aversion to fuel taxes: Businesses and some
participants believed the fuel tax would increase net personal
costs—Especially as individuals believed they were already
overtaxed. Furthermore, elasticity of fuel consumption was
perceived to be low, and therefore the tax was expected to
increase fuel costs but not to change incentives to shift to lowcarbon options—although some focus group participants agreed
they would change to low-carbon options if the tax increased
prices drastically. Loss of competitiveness and jobs and closure of
factories were further concerns. Focus groups found regulation,
higher standards, and enforcement, to be more viable mechanisms
for achieving environmental protection.
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Study
(listed in order of
publication year)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested

Methodological details

Empirical findings
Phasing in fuel taxes: Considered important by businesses for
allowing adjustment time for businesses and people.
Use of fuel tax revenues: Businesses and focus group participants
had a poor understanding of fiscal neutrality in the redistribution
of tax revenues, which implied increasing fuel taxes (according to
carbon content) and decreasing existing taxes. Most focus groups
did not trust the government to redistribute tax revenues.
Furthermore, a previous government had integrated many discrete
taxes into a single income tax, and therefore participants did not
want a new initiative under the word “tax” as they viewed this as
rescinding the terms of the 1970s tax reform. The most favorable
ways to recycle revenues were to earmark revenue for
environmental purposes (e.g., for improved technology grants and
support of improvements in energy efficiency, subsidized energy
audits and renewable energy, and improving energy efficiency of
buildings), and to reduce adverse distributional effects (e.g., with
grants to improve energy efficiency for low-income households
and sectoral exemptions to industry most vulnerable to foreign
competition). It also increased participants' trust that government
would spend the tax revenue on the original environmental
problem.

Deroubaix and
Lévèque (2006)

Where and when: France,
1999–2000.

Methodology: Qualitative analysis
of interviews and focus groups.

Data collection: Interviews with
Type of policy intervention:
policymakers and firms, and five
ETRs (with revenue recycled
focus groups representing the
to lower labor tax).
general public.
Implementation began in
1999 but was declared
unconstitutional by the
judicial court in 2000.
Dresner, Jackson, and
Gilbert (2006)

Where and when: United
Kingdom, 2000–2001 (after
policy announced but before
implementation).

Methodology: Qualitative analysis
of interviews and focus groups.

Explanations of aversion to energy taxes: Focus groups saw
regulations as a more acceptable policy intervention as it
prevented “free riding” as everyone had to adhere to the same
standard. Taxes were seen as a way of allowing the wealthy to
“pay to pollute.” Participants in the focus groups also preferred
earmarking energy tax revenue for environmental purposes as
doing so addresses the environmental problem, and increases
confidence and transparency in how revenue is used. Other forms
of revenue recycling, including keeping taxes revenue neutral,
were considered with great suspicion.
Aversion to environmental taxation generally: People were not
against environmental taxation outright, but more against the
specific design of the CCL.

Data collection: 10 interviews with
policymakers, eight with
Aversion to revenue-neutral fuel taxes: Most focus group
businesses, and five focus
participants were skeptical that a redistribution of the revenues
Type of policy intervention:
groups.
from the CCL would occur once the policy was in place. Nor did
Revenue-neutral measures of
people understand the purpose of the tax shift, and this increased
the Climate Change Levy
distrust in the government and generated suspicion that it would
(CCL—a carbon tax based
not redistribute the revenue. Focus groups did not see why
on carbon content of fuels).
recycling revenues from fuels should be used to “reward”
The CCL was announced in
reductions in labor taxes, or believed revenue-neutral fuel taxes
March 1999, its final design
would not be effective in reducing emissions by changing the
defined in March 2000, and
relative incentives between high- and low-carbon goods.
implemented in April 2001.
Use of fuel tax revenues: Focus group participants believed
earmarking revenue for environmental purposes (particularly
energy conservation) showed government commitment to
reducing emissions. Such earmarking would be targeted at
incentives for improving the environment.
Hammar and Jagers
(2006)

Where and when: Sweden,
2002.
Type of policy intervention:
Existing carbon tax on
transport fuels (with
hypothetical scenario of
increasing rates).

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of discrete choice
experiment involving different
attributes of carbon taxes on
transport fuels, including
increase in tax rates.

Increasing tax rates: Most of the samples were against increasing
existing fuel tax rates, with only 21% of respondents in favor.
However, findings show that increased confidence in the
effectiveness of the carbon tax to reduce emissions increases
support for raising the carbon tax. Therefore, information devices
to demonstrate that carbon taxes have changed incentives to lower
emissions are considered important to build support for increasing
Data collection: 1,270 responses to
future taxes.
a mailed survey.
Explanations of aversion to increasing carbon taxes: Trust in
politicians is the most significant factor to support an increase in
carbon tax rates, even within groups of similar people. Green
party members who have high trust in politicians are more likely
to support an increase in tax rate than those with low trust in
politicians. Motorists who trust their politicians are not more
likely to resist carbon tax increases than high-trusting persons
with no access to a car—suggesting that trust in politicians, rather
than self-interest, is the more important factor in understanding
resistance to tax increases.
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Study
(listed in order of
publication year)
Klok et al. (2006)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested

Methodological details

Empirical findings

Where and when: Denmark,
no date provided.

Methodology: Qualitative analysis
of interviews and focus groups.

Type of policy intervention:
Existing environmental tax
reforms, implemented in
Denmark in 1993 (involving
taxing fuel, carbon, and
water consumption to reduce
labor taxes on firms).

Data collection: Interviews with
businesses from five key
industries, and six focus groups
representing the general public.

Introducing and adjusting environmental taxes: Focus groups
showed less concern for global, and less visible, environmental
problems. Focus group participants called for independent
environmental authorities to provide information campaigns
showing how environmental taxes have visible and objective
environmental goals, prior to their introduction, and to provide
continuous feedback showing progress on how these objectives
are met once the tax is implemented. The tax can be adjusted
according to how well objectives are met.
Use of carbon tax revenues: Respondents believed environmental
taxes were a backdoor way to increase the general budget rather
than to change consumption incentives. Although Denmark has
implemented revenue-neutral environmental taxes since 1993,
few believed the redistribution worked in practice as they had not
seen reduction in labor taxes, nor were aware of any associated
increase in employment. Those who had had concern for sociallyadverse effects preferred tax designs that provided compensatory
measures, including using revenues for supporting low-income
and large families through subsidies or raised income tax
thresholds, personal green allowances, or progressive tax rate
systems. However, the most accepted use of revenues was
earmarking for environmental purposes, including rewarding
those firms/people who had put efforts into reducing their
environmental impacts (e.g., through special tax reductions).

Steg et al. (2006)

Where and when: Groningen,
Netherlands, 2003.

Dietz et al. (2007)

Where and when: Virginia
and Michigan, USA, 2004.

Hammar and Jagers
(2007)

Hsu et al. (2008)

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis based on survey
questionnaire testing
Type of policy intervention:16
psychological factors. The
hypothetical pricing policies
characteristics of these policies
aimed at reducing household
are emblematic of taxes (referred
CO2 emissions.
to as “push” policies in study),
subsidies (referred to as “pull”
policies), regulations (referred to
as “curtailment”), and measures
to promote energy efficiency.
Data collection: 112 responses
from mailed survey
questionnaires.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of carbon taxes: People
found subsidies more effective and acceptable than “coercive”
measures such as taxes, even when taxes were perceived to
increase the cost of high-carbon behavior. Regulations that limit
consumption were perceived less effective than measures that
promote energy efficiency.
Use of carbon tax revenues: Carbon taxes were seen to be
acceptable and effective when tax revenues were earmarked to
subsidize low-carbon options, rather than to be recycled into
general funds.

Type of policy intervention:
Eight hypothetical policies
proposed to reduce the
burning of fossil fuels.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of fuel taxes: Trust in
Methodology: Quantitative
different actors (environmental institutions, industry, and
analysis based on survey
government) played an important role in determining support for
questionnaire testing
environmental action, with lowest trust in industry, and highest in
psychological factors predicting
environmental NGOs.
policy support for different
hypothetical policy interventions.
Preferred policy intervention: Policies that increased the costs of
fuel consumption, such as a gas tax, had the least acceptance.
Data collection: Mailed survey
75% of the sample supported shifting subsidies for fossil fuels to
responses from 316 Michigan
cleaner forms of energy.
and Virginia residents.

Where and when: Sweden, no
date provided.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire.

Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical increase of
existing carbon tax on
transport fuels.

Data collection: 932 responses
from questionnaire mailed to a
random sample of the Swedish
population (with addresses
drawn from national register).

Where and when: Vancouver,
Canada, no date provided.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of discrete choice
experiment on increasing
gasoline tax by C$0.5, and
preferences for revenue use;
expression of tax rebates in
monetary or relative terms.

Type of policy intervention:
Existing gasoline tax with
hypothetical suggestion to
increase tax by C$0.5 per
liter.

Data collection: Face-to-face
surveys in public places in
Vancouver, with 797 responses.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of increase in fuel taxes:
Those who did not have cars, or drove infrequently, were more
inclined to support increasing the fuel tax, and believed that the
polluters should pay for the pollution that they caused (that is,
those who drive and pollute more should pay more). However,
those who used cars frequently were more likely to favor
distributing the costs of mitigation equally across the car-driving
population (that is, car drivers reduce pollution by the same
amount, regardless of how frequently they drive). Therefore selfinterest motivates in part how people perceive which principle is
the most fair in distributing the burden of climate policy.
Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of fuel taxes: Individuals
who were wealthier and more educated showed higher levels of
acceptance for increasing gasoline tax. Those who owned cars
were less likely to accept than those who did not.
General preference for earmarking gasoline taxes for
environmental purposes: Preference for earmarking gasoline
taxes was driven by an increase in the perceived effectiveness of
taxes with earmarking, and because respondents did not trust
government to redistribute revenue.
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Study
(listed in order of
publication year)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested

Methodological details

Empirical findings
Increasing acceptance of revenue-neutral gasoline taxes: Support
for revenue recycling increased when respondents were given
monetary figures of how much income tax was reduced with a
gasoline tax, rather than percentage reductions. People also
preferred revenue recycling to decrease income taxes rather than
sales taxes.

Jagers and Hammar
(2009)

Where and when: Sweden,
2002, 2003, and 2004.
Type of policy intervention:
Existing carbon tax on
transport fuels, with
hypothetical increase in tax
rate.

Aversion to increasing carbon tax rates: Swedes already see they
have a high-carbon tax rate, and would like increasing mitigation
efforts to be met with alternative policies, including decreasing
Data collection: Annual survey
taxes on fuels that do not affect the climate, expanding public
(repeated cross section) collected
transport, and increasing information campaigns about traffic's
from sampling the National
contribution to climate change.
Registry by the SOM Institute at
Potential acceptance of increasing carbon taxes with the right
the University of Gothenburg
information devices: Although Swedes have shown aversion to
(2002), authors (2003), and
increasing carbon tax rates to support more ambitious climate
SOM Institute (2004). Over
mitigation, they are even more averse to increasing tax rates for
1,000 responses from each year
income or municipal taxes. The implication is that if Swedes
used for the analysis.
would like to increase mitigation efforts by decreasing taxes on
low-carbon fuels or expanding public transport, the Ministry of
Finance would need to increase the rates of taxes that are even
more unpopular than the carbon tax in order to finance the
alternative mitigation options. Therefore, the authors argued,
providing budgetary information on each mitigation proposal
could increase support for increasing the carbon tax rate in
contrast to alternative proposals. Providing data on the
effectiveness of the existing carbon tax in decreasing emissions
could also increase support.
Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire.

Distribution of mitigation cost burden: Respondents found it
fairer to ask people who pollute the most to contribute a higher
proportion of mitigation efforts, rather than each individual
reducing the same proportion of emissions.
Bristow et al. (2010)

Where and when: Wales and
southeast England, 2008.
Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical carbon tax and
personal carbon-trading
designs.

Kallbekken and Aasen Where and when: Norway,
(2010)
2009.
Type of policy intervention:
Based on understanding of
existing taxes on fuel,
carbon, and electricity.

Kallbekken and Sælen Where and when: Norway,
(2011)
2010.
Type of policy intervention:
Alternative tax rates to

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of carbon taxes: There
Methodology: Quantitative
was no clear indication of whether people preferred carbon
analysis of discrete choice
pricing instruments in the form of a carbon tax or a personal
experiment on personal carbon
carbon trading scheme. Preference was based on how the carbon
trading versus carbon tax, with
pricing instrument was designed, based on the following factors:
attributes defining the design of
which emission sources were priced; how revenues were
each instrument (with differences
recycled; and the progressivity of the tax.
in sectors covered, how revenues
were recycled, and distribution
Use of carbon tax revenues: Increased preference for carbon tax
of costs).
when revenue earmarked for environmental reasons.
Data collection: 79 respondents in
Wales (recruited through a
citizens' forum) and 208
respondents in southeast England
(on-street recruitment).
Methodology: Qualitative analysis
of interview and focus group
data.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of carbon/energy taxes:
People preferred subsidies over taxes in addressing environmental
problems, as taxes represent a direct cost to the consumer.
Participants also wanted government to provide more information
Data collection: Five focus groups,
on the scope of the environmental problem in order to build
designed to reflect some
support for greater environmental action.
variation in the demographic
Use of carbon/energy tax revenues: People had a strong preference
characteristics of Norway.
for earmarking revenues from environmental taxes to address the
original environmental problem, as it was seen as a way to
improve the effectiveness of the tax, by reducing the cost of lowcarbon options (especially if participants expected a low elasticity
of demand for the carbon-intensive goods). Participants did not
believe revenue-neutral taxes were effective in reducing
environmental impact, and did not understand the purpose of
addressing social problems (like low unemployment) with
revenues from an environmental tax (referred to as an issuelinkage problem by Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011).
Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire
on acceptance levels for
decreasing, keeping constant or
increasing existing fuel tax rates,

Explanations of aversion to fuel taxes: Findings showed that selfinterest in terms of personal cost from fuel tax was not a
significant factor in people's aversion to fuel taxes. Instead,
people's beliefs in the environmental effectiveness of the fuel tax
in reducing emissions were significant. According to the authors,

CARATTINI ET AL.
APPENDIX A

19 of 26

(Continued)

Study
(listed in order of
publication year)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested
existing fuel tax in Norway
at the time of study.

Methodological details
including removing the tax
altogether.
Data collection: Nationwide online
survey of 1,177 Norwegians,
representative of Norwegian
public.

Empirical findings
this finding suggests that communication strategies need to be
used to show that people do respond to the fuel tax incentive by
reducing consumption of transport fuels, which leads to
decreasing emissions. Another reason why people are averse to
fuel taxes is the fear that it disproportionately impacts low-income
households, or those who live in rural areas and are more
dependent on driving as a form of transport. According to the
authors, this finding suggests that the fuel tax can be designed to
address these distributional concerns, through social cushioning
measures targeted at low-income households, or having
differentiated fuel taxes between rural and urban areas.
Low tax rates preferred: Voters on average preferred lower fuel
taxes, which may also imply preference for reducing existing
taxes.

Sælen and Kallbekken Where and when: Norway,
(2011)
2010.
Type of policy intervention:
Alternative tax designs to
existing fuel tax in Norway
at the time of study.

Brännlund and
Persson (2012)

Where and when: Sweden,
2009.
Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical climate policy
instruments, including a
hypothetical carbon tax.

Use of fuel tax revenues: Earmarking fuel taxes for environmental
purposes increased acceptance of fuel tax to the majority of
respondents, including increased acceptance of a hypothetical fuel
tax increase of 15% above the official rate at the time of the study.
The study showed that reasons for increased acceptance included
people expecting to personally benefit from the use of earmarked
Data collection: Nationwide online
revenues, and people perceiving earmarking for environmental
survey of 1,147 Norwegians,
purposes as a way to increase the effectiveness of the fuel tax,
representative of Norwegian
especially if they did not believe that the tax provides enough
public.
incentive to reduce emissions. Unlike other studies, the regression
analysis shows that distrust in how governments distribute
revenue is not among the reasons why Norwegians support
earmarking revenues. Recycling fuel tax revenues to reduce
income taxes did not achieve majority acceptance, as people
could not understand the link between using revenue raised from
addressing an environmental issue to be used to ameliorate a
labor issue (showing the issue-linkage problem). The least
preferred option was transferring revenues to the general budget.
Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of discrete choice
experiment with design options
differing in terms of tax rate and
how revenues are recycled.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of discrete choice
experiment of climate policy
instruments with different
resulting effects, including a
carbon tax resulting in personal
monthly cost ranging from 100
to 1,000 SEK.

Explanations of aversion to carbon taxes: Carbon taxes that result
in higher personal costs induced stronger aversion.
Preferred attributes of carbon tax: The findings showed that
people preferred climate policy instruments that support
environmentally-friendly technologies and have a progressive
cost distribution. According to the authors, these findings support
the idea of designing carbon taxes with these attributes.

Data collection: Administered via
online survey; responses from
2,400 respondents.
Leiserowitz et al.
(2013)

Where and when: USA, 2013.
Type of policy intervention:
Different types of carbon/
energy taxes, shifts in fossil
fuel subsidies, and
regulations (based on
existing and proposed
policies in the USA).

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire.
Data collection: 830 respondents
to national telephone survey in
the USA.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of carbon taxes: There
was majority support for low-carbon research (72%), tax
rebates for low-carbon technologies (71%), regulating
greenhouse gas emissions (67%), eliminating subsidies for the
fossil fuel industry (59%), and requiring electric utilities to
produce at least 20% of their electricity from renewable energy
sources, even if it cost the average household an extra $100 a
year (56% support). When evaluating the effectiveness of
various global warming and energy policies, less than half of
the sample were confident that: within the next decade, energy
from solar and wind will be cheaper than energy from fossil
fuels (48%); reducing the amount of oil the United States uses
would protect from high gas prices (48%); subsidies are an
effective way to support the diffusion of renewable energy
(43%); a carbon tax is an effective way to support the diffusion
of renewable energy (35%).
Use of carbon tax revenues: Acceptance of revenue-neutral energy
taxes by reducing other taxes varied depending on the specific
design: reducing the federal income tax (49% support); giving a
tax refund to every American household (47%); reducing the
federal payroll tax (45%). A straight carbon tax on fossil fuelproducing or importing companies, if it cost US$180/year per
average American household, was supported by 43% of the
sample.
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Study
(listed in order of
publication year)
Gevrek and
Uyduranoglu
(2015)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested
Where and when: Turkey,
2012.
Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical carbon tax.

Alberini et al. (2016)

Where and when: Italy, 2014.
Type of policy intervention:
Climate policies, including a
carbon tax, to reduce CO2
emissions from fossil fuels
and renewable energy use in
homes.

Methodological details

Empirical findings

Explanations of acceptance of carbon taxes: Respondents with
Methodology: Quantitative
high environmental awareness were more supportive of a carbon
analysis of discrete choice
tax than those with low environmental awareness.
experiment that provides
information on how different tax
rates result in a range of personal Tax rates: Generally, respondents preferred a carbon tax with a
lower tax rate. Respondents also preferred progressive tax rates to
monthly costs ranging from 2 to
address distributional concerns related with the tax burden on
6 Turkish Lira, and on how
low-income households. Respondents with high environmental
revenues are recycled.
awareness and high income were more willing than others to
Data collection: Face-to-face
accept a higher carbon tax rate.
interviews with 1,252 individuals
Use of carbon tax revenues: Respondents preferred to earmark
in 16 Turkish cities.
carbon tax revenues to subsidize low-carbon technologies, as it
was perceived as a way to improve the effectiveness of the tax.
Respondents preferred addressing distributional concerns through
a progressive tax rate, rather than with targeted transfers (social
cushioning) to low-income households.
Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of discrete choice
experiment that provides
different ranges of willingness to
pay (WTP) per ton of CO2
reduction for each policy, with
policies differing in attributes
according to: (a) goal of policy
(to improve energy efficiency or
renewable generation); (b)
specific policy, such as carbon
tax, subsidies, standards,
information-based policies, and
combinations thereof; (c)
reduction of CO2 emissions of
average household to baseline;
and (d) cost of the policy to the
respondent's household (on an
annual basis).

Explanations of aversion to carbon taxes: Opposition was highest
among those with lower education levels and those lacking
awareness of climate change.
WTP to mitigate CO2 emissions: WTP to mitigate 1tCO2e differs
according to climate instrument. Carbon taxes had the lowest
WTP at €6.44; the rate for information standards was €95.24; and
for incentives (i.e., subsidies for renewables and energy
efficiency), €133.15.
(Note: WTP is the maximum amount an individual is willing to
sacrifice to obtain a good or avoid something undesirable.)

Data collection: Online survey of
1,005 respondents who own and
reside in homes built in or before
2000.
Baranzini and
Carattini (2017)

Where and when: Geneva,
Switzerland, 2012.
Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical carbon tax
(with alternative label
“climate contribution”).

Methodology: Initial qualitative
interviews to inform survey
design, followed by a face-toface quantitative survey, split
among those asked about a
hypothetical carbon tax set at
120 CHF/tCO2, and those asked
about a hypothetical “climate
contribution” as an alternative
label to a carbon tax.
Quantitative analysis undertaken
on survey questionnaire.

Introducing carbon taxes at low rates: When respondents were
asked to define the ideal tax rate, they tended to prefer a carbon
tax rate that results in more moderate price increases on fuels than
the default rate proposed by the survey.
Use of carbon tax revenues: Where there was some distrust in
government, carbon taxes tended to be more acceptable if revenue
was earmarked for environmental purposes, in order to improve
their perceived effectiveness (60% of respondents wanted
earmarking for environmental purposes). This fits with the belief
held by 52% of respondents, who did not believe carbon taxes to
be effective. Social cushioning was the second most preferred
option to recycling revenues, with a small minority preferring tax
rebates to household and firms.

Data collection: Initial interviews
with 40 adults in Geneva,
Communicating primary and ancillary benefits of carbon tax:
followed by survey of 338
This is important as it increases the acceptability of the carbon
respondents, who were randomly
tax, as the primary obstacle to the carbon tax was its perceived
split with 158 being asked about
ineffectiveness, in reducing both global and local pollutants.
a hypothetical carbon tax, and
180 being asked about a climate
contribution.
Where and when: Czech
Šcasný, Zverinova,
Republic, Poland, and
Czajkowski, Kyselá
United Kingdom, 2015.
and Zagorsk
(2016 )
Type of policy intervention:
Targets for emission
reductions for 2030 and
2050 (as set out in EU
Climate and Energy
Package).

WTP for different EU climate targets for 2030 and 2050: The
Methodology: Quantitative
United Kingdom had the highest WTP for meeting the 2020,
analysis of discrete choice
2030, and 2050 targets, followed by the Czech Republic. Both
experiment containing four
countries showed support for the 2014 Climate and Energy
attributes of climate policy for
Package targets. The study shows in Poland there was a negative
EU mitigation efforts: emission
WTP, but it is not statistically significant. However, Polish
reduction targets for each period
respondents did prefer keeping the current targets, as stated in the
year (as set out in 2014 Climate
2020 targets.
and Energy Package, with 40%
reduction by 2030, and 80%
reduction by 2050); and different
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Study
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publication year)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested

Methodological details
options for sharing costs of
mitigation.
Data collection: Online
questionnaires administered in
each country; 4,098 responses.

Carattini et al. (2017)

Where and when:
Switzerland, 2015.
Type of policy intervention:
ETR on nonrenewable fuels
(ballot) and hypothetical
carbon tax.

Kotchen, Turk, and
Leiserowitz (2017)

Where and when: USA, 2016.
Type of policy intervention:
Carbon tax (hypothetical
tax).

Empirical findings
Burden sharing rule among countries: Respondents in the Czech
Republic and the United Kingdom preferred the distribution of
costs for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to be based on those
who emit the most paying a higher cost (or in aggregate,
emissions per country). Polish households were less willing to
distribute burden sharing on emissions per country, and did not
have a preference over the other types of burden-sharing rules.

Explanations of aversion to ETR: 92% of voters voted “no” in the
Methodology: Two surveys,
2015 referendum. The main reasons for this were concern that
following the vote on a popular
increased energy tax rates would have a disproportionate impact
initiative suggesting to replace
on low-income households and firms vulnerable to global
the existing value-added tax with
competition, and the perception that the nonrenewable energy tax
a tax on nonrenewable energy. In
would be ineffective.
one survey, this specific design
is compared with other
Concern over tax rates: The ballot survey suggested that most
alternative (hypothetical)
concerns were related to the high tax rate that would have been
designs, with different tax rates
necessary (especially in the future) to completely replace the
and use of revenues. Quantitative
revenues from the value-added tax. The discrete choice
analysis of two sets of data:
experiment provided additional evidence on the negative
“VOX” opinion survey on
relationship between tax rate and acceptability. In this respect,
voting behavior, and discrete
people with low levels of climate change concern tended to have
choice experiment on alternative
a higher sensitivity to tax rates, while people with stronger
policy design. Discrete choice
climate change concern tended to pay less attention to price
experiment respondents were
levels.
previously contacted by mail
with information about the
Importance of providing full information, including credible
survey and the different tax
modeled results, on the effects of different recycling options of
designs, whose effects on the
energy tax revenues: The VOX survey showed that people's
economy, low-income
acceptance of the tax on nonrenewable energy would have
households, and greenhouse gas
increased if revenues were earmarked for environmental
emissions had been simulated
purposes. However, the results from the discrete choice
with a computable general
experiment arrived at a different conclusion, as that survey
equilibrium model of the Swiss
provided respondents with modeled impacts of each tax design
economy.
proposal on: (a) the price of fuels, (b) greenhouse gas emissions,
(c) purchasing power of the average Swiss household, and (d)
Data collection: Surveys
purchasing power of the average low-income household. By
administered after the
providing information on the comparative impacts between
referendum. VOX survey
different recycling options, the discrete choice experiment reveals
administered by telephone to
that information may change preferences for revenue recycling, as
1,500 respondents and discrete
environmental earmarking is no longer the most popular option.
choice experiment administered
That is, providing “full information,” including on the
via telephone survey to 1,200
environmental and distributional effects of each type of recycling
respondents.
option, made more progressive forms of recycling (such as lump
sum transfers or social cushioning measures) more acceptable,
even more than earmarking for environmental purposes. The
discrete choice experiment also shows that recycling revenues by
reducing existing taxes was not popular (similar to the
referendum results).
Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire.

Explanations of aversion to carbon taxes: Respondents who
believe global warming is currently happening were 35
percentage points more likely to support the carbon tax than those
Data collection: Survey of 1,226
who stated they did not know if global warming is happening,
American adults drawn from
while those who do not believe global warming is happening
GfK's Knowledge Panel, an
were 25 percentage points less likely to support the carbon tax,
online digital platform in which
compared with those who did not know. Respondents' age,
survey respondents are signed up
gender, years of education, and size of household they belong to,
as members for polled surveys.
did not have a significant effect on the probability of supporting a
To seek national
carbon tax, but income and race did. For example, a US$10,000
representativeness, the
increase in a household's annual income increased the likelihood
questionnaire was sent to
of support by 1 percentage point.
members drawn using
probability sampling methods,
WTP for carbon tax: The average respondent household was
willing to pay 14.4% more on their household energy bill in
and key demographic variables
support of a carbon tax. In monetary terms, this translates to
were weighted, post survey, to
US$177 per year, with a confidence interval ranging from $101 to
match U.S. Census Bureau
$587. However, there was a negative and statistically significant
norms.
effect of cost: a $10 increase in the annual household cost of the
tax reduced the probability of support by 1 percentage point.
Earmarking carbon tax revenues for specific purposes: The most
preferred option was to earmark tax revenue for developing clean
energy (using 17.3% of carbon tax revenues), followed by
funding improvements in infrastructure (using 14.5% of carbon
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Study
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publication year)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested

Methodological details

Empirical findings
tax revenues). Respondents also supported using carbon tax
revenue to help communities—particularly low-income
communities most vulnerable to climate change—for assistance
to adapt to climate change (using a total of 15% of revenues).
More than 70% of respondents supported using 10.4% of carbon
tax revenue to compensate workers in the coal mining industry,
who could lose their jobs as a result of the carbon tax. The study
calculates that earmarking this percentage of carbon tax revenue
could lead to paying US$146,000 to all coal mining workers if
the passage of the carbon tax was to lead to the entire industry
shutting down.
Options of using carbon tax revenue: The options which received
over 50% support include reducing the national debt and federal
income taxes (by using 12.7 and 9.9% use of carbon tax revenues,
respectively). Those taxes that received less than 50% support to
be reduced with the carbon tax revenues include the federal
payroll taxes (e.g., social security and Medicare) and corporate
taxes.

A P P E N D IX B: E M P I RI C AL F IN D IN GS T E S T IN G F AC T O RS A F F E CT IN G T H E
A CC E P T ABI L I T Y O F O T H E R “ P IG O V I A N ” T AXE S

Study
(listed in order of
publication year)
Odeck and
Bråthen (2002)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested
Where and when: Norwegian
cities of Bergen (tax
introduced in 1986), Oslo
(tax introduced in 1990), and
Trondheim (tax introduced
in 1992)
Type of policy intervention:
Road user congestion
charging (existing).

Schade and
Schlag (2003)

Where and when: Athens,
Greece; Como, Italy;
Dresden, Germany; and
Oslo, Norway, 1998–1999.
Type of policy intervention:
Road user congestion
charging (hypothetical for
Athens, Como and Dresden
at the time the study was
administered, but existing for
Oslo).

Halbheer, Niggli,
and Schmutzler
(2006)

Methodological details
Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire
on road user attitudes, where
respondents were asked to state,
from a list of possible
alternatives, their positive or
negative attitudes toward the
implementation of the road toll.
Data collection: Annual road user
attitude survey collected in
Norway, with data for each city
specific to the years before and
after the congestion charge was
introduced.
Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of discrete choice
experiment between two
hypothetical policy packages
which have “strong” and “weak”
measures. These packages differ
according to tax rates and how
revenues are recycled.
Data collection: Mailed surveys to
motorists in each city (total
sample size is 954 with 150 from
Athens, 238 from Como,
281 from Dresden and 285 from
Oslo).

Where and when:
Switzerland, 1977–2003.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of ballot outcomes.

Type of policy intervention:
45 Swiss referenda that have
some relation to the
environment: 24 on
transport, 13 on energy, and
8 on landscape preservation
and agriculture.

Data collection: Ballot data for the
45 referenda held between 1977
and 2003 in Switzerland.

Empirical findings
Phasing in congestion charging: Negative attitudes toward road toll
charging declined a year after implementation (in comparison with
a year before the introduction of the tax) in all three cities, with
negative attitudes in Bergen and Trondheim decreasing to below
50%, and from 70 to 64% in Oslo. The study suggests that before
introduction, people are less aware of the benefits of the toll and
therefore only use anticipated costs to form their beliefs. In
comparing how charges were introduced in each city, it was found
that introducing taxes at a lower rate decreased negative attitudes.
The study also highlights the importance of using information
campaigns to show how charging may be the best policy option to
address the original problem of road congestion.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of congestion charging:
The strongest factor for accepting the charge was values held by
peers/society (rather than personal beliefs) in addressing the
problem of congestion through charging. The second strongest
factor was expectations of how the charge would impact people's
situation. The weak policy package, which had lower rates and used
revenue to lower the costs of transport (rather than to decrease labor
income as in the strong package), had greater acceptance in all
cities. According to the authors, this suggests that there is greater
acceptance of policy packages that introduce taxes at a lower rate,
and use tax revenues to compensate affected constituents through
other measures.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of environmental taxes:
Environmental referenda were not more likely to be rejected
(or accepted) if they included an environmental tax. Policies that
were most likely to be rejected were ones that restricted consumer
choice (e.g., limiting the driving of cars). In fact, environmental
referenda proposals which included taxes with a relatively low rate
had higher acceptance rates than proposals that included strict
regulations limiting consumer choice.
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Gaunt
et al. (2007)

Where and when: Edinburgh,
UK, 2005.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis on survey questionnaire.

Type of policy intervention:
Road-user congestion
charging (after proposal
failed in referendum).

Data collection: Postal selfcompletion questionnaire sent to
1,300 randomly selected
households, with an
approximately 25%
response rate.

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of congestion charging:
Self-interest was the main motivator in rejecting the scheme:
opposition by car owners was greater than support from noncar
owners, cyclists, and bus users. Although congestion was
acknowledged as a problem, voters did not believe congestion
charging would be effective in reducing congestion and improving
environmental conditions (it was believed that car owners would
pay the charge and still drive in congestion zones).
Opposition to phasing in congestion charging: Respondents feared
the introduction of congestion charging at a low rate would
eventually lead to increasing rates.
Earmarking to address congestion not always accepted: The
promise of improving public transport was not believed by the
public. Plus, responses indicated a belief that existing public
transport was already good. Additionally, there was a lack of trust
in government in how tax revenues would be spent.

Schuitema and
Steg (2008)

Where and when:
Netherlands, no date
provided.
Type of policy intervention:
Road-user congestion
charging (hypothetical).

Winslott-Hiselius
et al. (2009)

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis on survey questionnaire.
Data collection: 507 Dutch
respondents, drawn from a Dutch
marketing firm's database.
Respondents were randomly
selected from a database of
commuters who experienced
congestion during the morning
rush hour at least twice a week.

Where and when: Stockholm,
Sweden, 2004–2006.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire.

Type of policy intervention:
Road-user congestion
charging made permanent
after a trial period conducted
in the first half of 2006.

Data collection: Total of 1,600
telephone interviews conducted
during 2004, 2005, and 2006.

Use of congestion charging revenues: Acceptability of congestion
charging depended on how revenue was recycled—especially if
those taxed felt they were compensated for the personal costs of
congestion charging. There was increased acceptance if congestion
charging was to be used to reduce other car-related taxes. Findings
also show the importance of information campaigns to show how
congestion charging will create benefits through revenue recycling.

Phasing in congestion charging: 15% of respondents were more
positive about the congestion charge during the trial than before it
started. This increase seems to be enough to make congestion
charging acceptable, as 51.3% of the inhabitants in the city of
Stockholm voted in favor of a permanent solution with congestion
charges after the trial period.
Benefits of trial period: Respondents who increased their acceptance
of congestion charging during the trial period personally
experienced the benefits of congestion charging (in terms of
reduced congestion and improved air quality), in contrast to their
perception before the trial period.
Importance of improving public transport: The government
committed to improving public transport by running more services
during the trial period, which caused some road users to accept
using public transport in place of their cars, and at the same time
avoided complaints about overcrowding on public transport from
commuters.

Schuitema
et al. (2010)

Kallbekken
et al. (2011)

Where and when: Stockholm,
Sweden, 2005 and 2006.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of survey questionnaire.

Type of policy intervention:
Road-user congestion
charging made permanent
after a trial period conducted
in the first half of 2006.

Data collection: Mailed survey of
143 respondents interviewed in
December 2005 and August
2006 (i.e., before and after trial
period).

Where and when: Innsbruck,
Austria.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of data generated from a
lab experiment with a market
and an externality. The lab
experiment consisted of a market
for a fictitious good in which
some buyers imposed external
costs on others through their
purchases. After initial trading
periods without taxation, buyers
participated in four votes, in
which they faced binomial
choices between the instrument

Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical Pigovian tax
schemes.

Greater acceptance of congestion charging after trial period than
before: The reason for increased acceptance after the trial period
was that people were able to experience the benefits of congestion
charging (e.g., reduced congestion, parking problems, and
pollution) during the trial period, and therefore saw the
effectiveness of congestion charging (especially if it led to
individuals reducing own car use by having alternative options
available at the same time). Furthermore the costs of congestion
charging were not as high as participants expected before the trial
period.
Tax aversion may be such that people vote against tax schemes
that serve their own material self-interest, while increasing
social welfare: Efficiency-enhancing Pigovian taxes can increase
individuals' pay-offs as well as social (group) welfare. Interestingly,
in this lab setting, providing information on how Pigovian taxes
work seemed not to reduce tax aversion.
Labeling and use of Pigovian tax revenues: Respondents preferred
tax schemes that earmarked the revenue to target the original
externality problem. When taxes were earmarked, it did not matter
if the instrument was labeled a “tax” or a “fee.” However, if tax
revenue was redistributed through lump-sum transfers, then the
label “tax” did reduce support in comparison to “fee.”
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being referred to as a tax or a
fee, and with different rules for
how to distribute the collected
tax revenues (including a no tax
scheme). After trading and
voting finishes, subjects were
given a questionnaire, to test
their understanding of
implications of tax schemes for
additional costs to others,
payoffs to themselves, and the
group as a whole.
Data collection: Experiment was
conducted at the University of
Innsbruck with a total of
160 students as participants.
Cherry
et al. (2012)

Where and when: Colorado,
USA, 2011.
Type of policy intervention:
Pigovian taxes, subsidies,
and regulations.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of data generated from a
lab experiment with a market
and an externality. The lab
experiment consisted of a market
for a fictitious good in which
some buyers imposed external
costs on others through their
purchases. The experiment had
three treatment variables, which
altered the characteristics of the
policy that participants could
support, in a referendum, to
address the externality:
instrument type (tax, subsidy,
and regulation), efficiency (full
measure, half measure, and no
policy), and language (label and
generic; see next column).

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of carbon taxes: Although
people were strongly averse to taxes, this finding is not specific to
taxes only, as people generally were averse to any type of market
intervention. However, they preferred subsidies over taxes and
taxes over regulations that limit consumption levels.
Preferred tax rates: In the case of regulation, “half” measures were
preferred to more efficient “full” measures. In the case of carbon
taxes (and subsidies), “full” measures were preferred when
contrasted against “half” measures, but not necessarily when
contrasted against the status quo (no policy).

Data collection: Lab experiment
taking place at Colorado State
University, involving 95 subjects
participating in five sessions,
each session consisting of nine
referenda.
de Groot and
Schuitema
(2012)

Where and when:
Bournemouth, UK, 2010.
Type of policy intervention:
Interventions to address car
use and littering.

Methodology and data collection:
Quantitative analysis of a
discrete choice experiment which
had participants choose between
policy interventions to address
two different environmental
problems—car use and littering.
The issues were to be addressed
with a tax/fine or subsidized
low-carbon options. Participants
were also given information on
the level of support for each
intervention among the UK
population.
Data collection: Responses from
123 individuals recruited from
public spaces in Bournemouth.

Cherry
et al. (2014)

Where and when:
Copenhagen, Denmark,
2009.
Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical Pigovian tax.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of data generated from a
lab experiment with a market
and an externality. The
experiment focused on Pigovian
taxes to address the externality
and had a two-by-two design:
(a) the rates are set at threshold
level or at the full tax and

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of different policy
interventions: Policies that subsidized low-carbon options were
more accepted than policies that imposed a direct cost on polluters,
as the latter were seen to be more coercive in restricting polluting
behavior. Policies that targeted perceived “high cost” behaviors
(such as reducing car use) were less acceptable than policies that
targeted behaviors that had a low perceived cost to change
(e.g., reducing littering).
People were more willing to support policies that other people also
support: People were willing to accept policies that they initially
rejected (e.g., increasing taxes on car use) if they saw that their
peers/the general population was willing to support them.
According to the authors, this finding demonstrates the importance
of governments taking long-term action to build support for
protecting the environment (including for environmental taxes). It
also shows that when there is high support for environmental taxes,
governments should disclose these statistics to show undecided
voters that these taxes are widely supported.
Phasing in Pigovian taxes: Trial runs increased acceptability for
Pigovian taxes when participants observed benefits during the trial,
suggesting that people's aversion to Pigovian taxes was due to their
misperception about the purpose and effects of the tax. Trial runs
increased acceptance of taxes set at the threshold rate (where tax is
imposed only after a minimum level of consumption) and also at
the full rate (taxes imposed on all consumption). The experiment
shows trial periods reduced aversion because people were able to

CARATTINI ET AL.
APPENDIX B

25 of 26

(Continued)

Study
(listed in order of
publication year)

Location, year and type of
policy intervention tested

Methodological details
(b) Pigovian tax is preceded with
a trial run or not.

Empirical findings
perceive benefits of the tax. Still, it should be noted that the
preference for the threshold tax was greater than for the full tax.

Data collection: Lab experiment
held at the University of
Copenhagen, which had nine
sessions that in total involved
170 students.
Heres et al. (2015)

Where and when: Bilbao,
Spain, 2012.
Type of policy intervention:
Hypothetical subsidies
versus hypothetical Pigovian
taxes.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of experimental data
obtained in a lab experiment,
where participants faced the
same economic incentives but
had different information
on them.
Data collection: Eight
experimental sessions (involving
four stages) at the University of
Bilbao, involving a total of
195 participants anonymously
interacting in groups of five via
computer terminals.

Tiezzi and Xiao
(2016)

Where and when:
Pittsburgh, USA.
Type of policy intervention:
Pigovian tax (hypothetical).

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of lab experiment data.
Lab experiment is designed with
market that has a two-by-two
treatment design: (a) either the
external costs of consuming a
fictitious good occur in the same
time period as when the good
was consumed (“No Delay”
treatment), or the external costs
occur in a later time period to
when the good was consumed
(“Delay” treatment); and
simultaneously (b) either the
group started without a revenueneutral Pigovian tax (in which
case, groups voted on whether to
introduce a revenue-neutral
Pigovian tax), or with a revenueneutral Pigovian tax (where the
participants voted on whether to
remove the tax).
Data collection: Conducted at the
Pittsburgh Experimental
Economics Laboratory (PEEL)
with 12 sessions involving a total
of 212 student participants.

Cherry
et al. (2017)

Where and when:
Colorado, USA.
Type of policy intervention:
Pigovian tax, subsidy, and
regulations limiting
consumption.

Methodology: Quantitative
analysis of lab experiment data.
The lab experiment has an
experimental market consisting
of five buyers who buy a
fictitious good that imposes
external costs on others. The

Explanations of aversion to/acceptance of Pigovian taxes: When
there was a lack of budgetary information provided for either
instrument, people were more likely to prefer a subsidy over a
Pigovian tax, as they expected to obtain a higher personal payoff
with a subsidy. However, subjects did not expect a subsidy or the
tax to differ in their effectiveness in reducing negative externalities.
Importance of providing complete budgetary information on
subsidies and Pigovian taxes to help voters choose from
different instruments: Findings showed increased acceptance of
using either subsidies or Pigovian taxes to address negative
externalities when more (or complete) budgetary information
involving either instrument was provided (for subsidies the
information involved how it would be financed, while for taxes it
was how the revenues would be used). In fact, providing complete
budgetary information on taxes changed participants' perception
that taxes only impose costs on consumption, and demonstrated
how people can gain from taxes through distribution of tax
revenues. When information was incomplete, the results suggested
that subsidies were expected to increase individual payoffs by a
larger amount than redistribution of tax revenue would achieve.
This finding supports the idea that voters should receive complete
budgetary implications for all subsidies and taxes in order to judge
which instrument would benefit them the most.
Explanations of aversion to Pigovian taxes: When people did not
immediately experience the effects of a negative externality at the
time of consumption, they were less willing to accept Pigovian
taxes to change consumption behavior, and preferred to delay
implementing a tax. This unwillingness to accept the Pigovian tax
occurred even when the tax was framed as the default policy option
for addressing the externality problem. Since, according to the
authors, a reasonable discount rate does not suffice to explain this
pattern, it is suggested that voter aversion to Pigovian taxes is
driven by the complexity of the underlying externality, in this case
represented by the delayed response of the externality to the change
in pollution levels.
Aversion to Pigovian taxes declined after participants had become
aware of the benefits of immediately implementing taxes to
reduce the costs of the externality in future periods: The
majority of respondents who voted against the tax switched views
when they felt the immediate benefits of the tax in reducing the
problems of the externality. According to the authors, this finding is
worrying as the negative effects of externalities such as climate
change are not felt in the same time period as when polluting
activities occur (i.e., there is a delayed negative effect). However,
when explicit information about the intertemporal trade-off
(between consuming now and bearing costs later) was provided,
participants were more willing to accept the tax.
Suggestions to introduce Pigovian taxes: According to the authors,
the implications of the study are that trial periods for Pigovian taxes
are more easily accepted when the benefits can immediately be
perceived. In cases where the benefits of the tax are not
immediately experienced, the study suggests having government
campaigns that can explain the costs of delaying action to help
voters accept tax in earlier time periods.
Explanations of aversion to Pigovian taxes: Generally, respondents
were averse to any type of policy intervention to correct for
negative externalities. Subsidies were the most preferred policy
intervention in comparison to taxes and quantity restricting
regulations (quotas). However, world views do play a role in the
level of aversion to policy interventions, and the type of policy
intervention. The study found that people who were more
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Methodological details
experiment provides six policy
options that vary across
instrument type (tax, subsidy or
quantity regulation) and
efficiency level (full and half ).
After the lab session, a
questionnaire is given to
participants to elicit their world
views.
Data collection: Eight sessions
involving 160 students from
Colorado State University.

Empirical findings
hierarchical and/or individualistic were more averse to policy
intervention than those who were more egalitarian and/or
communitarian. “Coercive” instruments were more offensive to
individualists, but instruments that enable redistribution were more
attractive to egalitarian types.
Introducing Pigovian taxes: The study found that in the initial
absence of corrective policies for externalities, people preferred
starting at a half rate than full rate for Pigovian pricing instruments.
It should be noted that world views (hierarchical vs. egalitarian, and
individualistic vs. communitarian) had no significant effect on
preference over the rate at which policies should be set.
Experience does not increase acceptance for Pigovian taxes:
Aversion to policies declined for subsidies and quantity restricting
policies if participants had experienced these instruments in
previous periods. This decline in aversion increased the likelihood
of support in current referenda. However, in this study, this effect
was not found for Pigovian taxes.

Carattini,
Baranzini, and
Lalive (2018)

Where and when: Canton of
Vaud, Switzerland, 2012 and
2013.
Type of policy intervention:
Pricing household waste by
the bag (unit pricing).

Methodology: Econometric
analysis (difference-in-difference
approach) that compares
acceptance and effectiveness of
pricing waste by the bag. The
analysis exploits the decision by
the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland to mandate the
implementation of unit pricing in
all municipalities in the canton.
Municipalities implementing the
policy represented the treatment
group. Municipalities that
already had unit pricing prior to
the Supreme Court decision
represented the control group.
Data collection: Telephone
interviews with households in
municipalities in the “control”
group (48 municipalities) and
“treatment” group
(22 municipalities), with a total
of 193 households participating.
Interviews were realized both
before and after the treatment
occurs. Administrative data from
all municipalities were used to
measure per capita household
waste (from 2008 to 2013).
Interviews with 44 municipalities
on policies to help individuals
dispose of their waste were also
carried out.

Waste tax does change behavior: Pricing household waste by the
bag was shown to decrease waste by 40%, and to increase recycling
of aluminum and organic waste.
Phasing in waste taxes: People's perceptions toward pricing waste by
the bag improved significantly once they experienced the policy. A
substantial proportion of respondents revised their beliefs
concerning the policy's effectiveness and fairness: respondents were
willing to support a price 70% higher for a bag of waste after the
policy implementation than before.

